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Abstract
We investigate the effect of individualism—a dimension of culture that is strongly 
associated with entrepreneurship—on venture-capital investments using a large 
cross-country sample. Our sample consists of 1496 country-year observations and 
includes 88 countries from 1998 to 2014. Controlling for economic conditions, the 
legal environment, and different aspects of culture, we find that individualism is 
positively and significantly related to venture-capital investments and explains 30% 
of cross-country variation. This result is stable across different subsamples, several 
measures of venture-capital investments, and even holds when using the political 
system 200 years ago as an instrument for individualism. The quality of formal insti-
tutions (rule of law) and entrepreneurial attitudes (uncertainty avoidance) partially 
mediate the effect of individualism on venture-capital investments, while economic 
conditions (GDP per capita) moderate this effect.
Keywords Comparative entrepreneurship · Cultural values · Individualism · 
Institutions · Venture capital
1 Introduction
The success of the US Silicon Valley is often reported to stem from the American 
spirit of entrepreneurship, people’s risk appetite, and their capitalistic mentality. 
These factors are usually recognized to provide an ideal breeding ground for the 
launch of start-ups and the provision of venture capital (see The Economist 2009). 
According to several authors (see, e.g., Gompers and Lerner 2001; Jeng and Wells 
2000; Kortum and Lerner 2000; Popov and Roosenboom 2013; Samila and Soren-
son 2011), start-ups are fundamental for innovation and productivity, the renewal 
of economies, the creation of jobs, and economic growth. In line with this view, the 
G20 leaders concluded in their 2014 Summit that the ‘promotion of competition, 
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entrepreneurship and innovation’ would help increasing economic growth. Given 
the importance of venture capital for economic development, researchers have put 
considerable efforts in explaining different drivers of venture-capital investments. In 
particular, scholars were able to show that different formal institutions matter for the 
development of venture-capital markets.1
In spite of these findings, the academic community still struggles in explain-
ing the large differences in venture-capital investments across countries (see, e.g., 
Wright et al. 2005). In particular, although cultural aspects are recognized to affect 
economic outcomes in a variety of situations and dimensions (see, e.g., Franke 
et al. 1991; Li et al. 2011) and Fukuyama (1995, p. 103) has argued that “[…] non-
rational factors like culture, religion, tradition, and other pre-modern sources, will 
be key to the success of modern societies in a global economy”, no study has so far 
studied the direct influence of individualism—a cultural trait that emphasizes indi-
vidual freedom, personal responsibility, self-reward, self-orientation, as well as per-
sonal achievement and fulfillment—on venture-capital investments. This research 
gap is surprising, as Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012) and Heine (2008) convinc-
ingly argue that individualism is the most important aspect in cross-cultural psy-
chology and represents the main cultural divide in today’s world.
In this paper, we address this research gap by studying the influence of individu-
alism on venture-capital investments across countries and considering both moderat-
ing and mediating variables of this relationship. On the theoretical side, we argue 
that individualism encompasses entrepreneurial characteristics and thus fosters ven-
ture-capital investments. Furthermore, individualism is also positively related with 
the quality of formal institutions (e.g., rule of law) and informal institutions (e.g., 
generalized trust) that both support venture-capital activity. In this respect, the paper 
builds on the insights from new institutional theorists, such as North (1990). Fig-
ure 1 summarizes the structure of our analysis by depicting these relationships and 
highlighting the positioning of the paper.
On the empirical side, we perform an extensive empirical analysis on a sample 
of 1496 country-year observations based on ca. 300,000 venture-capital transac-
tions across 88 countries over the period 1998–2014. We show that individualism 
accounts for 30% of cross-country variation in venture-capital investments, which 
makes it the single most important variable in terms of cross-country explanatory 
power. Furthermore, we show that even after accounting for a large set of controls, 
moderating variables, suitable mediating variables, and endogeneity issues, the 
direct effect of individualism on venture-capital investments persists both statisti-
cally and economically. Finally, based on an extensive analysis of moderating and 
mediating effects, we offer evidence that the influence of individualism on venture-
capital investments is moderated by economic conditions (GDP per capita) and 
1 Armour and Cumming (2006) focus on the importance of the political and legal framework; Black 
and Gilson (1998) underline the relevance of financial-markets development; Da Rin et al. (2006) stress 
the importance of the tax system; and Jeng and Wells (2000) find evidence for the significance of labor-
market regulations. Lerner and Tag (2013) show, among other things, the importance of public spending 
for R&D investments and its value for venture-capital activities.
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partially mediated by the quality of formal institutions (rule of law) and entrepre-
neurial attitudes (uncertainty avoidance).
Our study contributes in several ways to different strains of literature. First, we 
contribute to the growing literature that links culture to economic outcomes and 
decisions (see, e.g., Chen et al. 2015; Guiso et al. 2003, 2006, 2009; Li et al. 2011). 
Second, we add to the current debate on the relative importance of individualism 
within the broader spectrum of culture [see, e.g., Gorodnichenko and Roland 2012; 
Heine 2008; Hofstede et al. 2010 (HHM)]. Third, and most importantly, our study 
contributes to the ongoing discussion on the determinants of venture-capital mar-
kets (see, e.g., Armour and Cumming 2006; Jeng and Wells 2000; Lerner and Tag 
2013; Li et al. 2014) by establishing, for the first time, a direct relationship between 
individualism and venture-capital investments across countries. In contrast to Li 
and Zahra (2012)—who suggest that culture moderates the effect of formal institu-
tions on venture-capital investments—we show that individualism is the single most 
important cultural element in explaining venture-capital investments. Fourth, as 
institutional theorists argue that institutions (formal and informal) affect economic 
outcomes both directly and indirectly (North 1990, 1994; Scott 1995; Williamson 
2000), we contribute to the understanding of these issues by providing an extensive 
analysis of the moderating and mediating effects in the relationship between indi-
vidualism and venture-capital investments.
The sample of 88 countries employed in this paper is larger than the samples used 
in existing studies on the determinants of cross-country venture-capital investments 
(e.g., Anokhin and Schulze 2009: 64 countries; Da Rin et  al. 2006: 14 countries; 
Jeng and Wells 2000: 21 countries; Li and Zahra 2012: 68 countries). As our sample 
includes both developed countries and emerging markets, we are able to capture a 
larger variety of manifestations of individualism as well as economic and institu-
tional conditions.
In the paper, we specifically address the recommendations of Kirkman et  al. 
(2006), as elaborated in Beugelsdijk et al. (2017) on HHM-inspired work. First, we 
make sure to establish a clear distinction between country and culture by controlling 
for a large set of country-specific characteristics beside culture, such as economic 
Fig. 1  Theoretical model on the relationship between individualism and venture-capital investments
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conditions (e.g., GDP growth, GDP per capita, and exports), geographic condi-
tions (e.g., latitude and malaria infections), and the formal institutional environment 
(e.g., the legal system). The relationship is robust to the inclusion of all the above 
controls and holds for different subsamples (e.g., different income groups and time 
subperiods).
Second, we consider and explore cultural values beyond those proposed in HHM 
by including cultural characteristics, such as religion, language, and World Value 
Survey’s trust in the regressions.
Third, throughout the paper, we stress not only the statistical significance of the 
influence of individualism on venture-capital investments but also its economics sig-
nificance in terms of magnitude and explanatory power.
Finally, we address endogeneity concerns by using an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach that confirms the main findings. Our instrument (polity score) measures 
the characteristics of a country’s political system between the Congress of Vienna 
(1815) and just before the outbreak of World War I (1914), i.e., within the period 
1816–1913. As this period was relatively stable, it likely laid ground to the values 
and norms that define individualism in modern societies. We provide evidence that 
the polity score is a valid instrument as it is related with individualism but is uncor-
related with venture-capital investments.
2  Theoretical Framework
2.1  Venture Capital
The prosperity of economies depends on the commercialization of ideas. The trans-
formation from innovative ideas into new products often originates from start-ups 
(see Kortum and Lerner 2000) that require financial resources in the form of ven-
ture capital (see, e.g., Jeng and Wells 2000). In this respect, the definition of ven-
ture capital used in this paper is broad and includes all types of equity financing 
provided to young companies by a variety of investors, such as family members, 
friends, and ‘fools’ (3F-Hypothesis), business angels, foundations, pension funds, 
or venture-capital funds. On the contrary, start-ups cannot typically rely on either 
internal financing or external debt, because they lack both (stable) cash flows and 
tangible assets to be pledged as collateral.
Unfortunately, venture-capital financing tends to be scarce for several reasons. 
First, it is intrinsically risky due to the large number of potential pitfalls that can 
jeopardize a steady growth path of start-ups and which ultimately results in very 
high failure rates (Cochrane 1981; Stinchcombe 1965). Second, venture-capital 
investments are characterized by a material asymmetric distribution of information 
(also due to a relatively low level of transparency) and serious conflict of interests 
between investors and start-up founders (see Amit et al. 1998; Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Sahlman 1990). In particular, venture-capital investors often have to overcome 
an information disadvantage with respect to the technology, the founders’ skills, and 
their commitment. Further, the entrepreneurs are often emotionally bounded to the 
firm, whereas the venture capitalists mainly focus on the return on investment.
1 3
Individualism and Venture Capital: A Cross-Country Study 
The entrepreneurs’ creativity and innovations are key drivers of economic devel-
opment. While lasting peace or open economies are basic conditions for economic 
growth and good laws can act as a transmitter, Cooter and Schäfer (2012) point out 
that the economic development of a country affects the provision of (non-relational) 
venture capital. Several studies show that the countries’ (formal) institutional envi-
ronment, e.g., their political and legal framework (see Armour and Cumming 2006), 
financial-markets development (see Black and Gilson 1998), tax system (see Da Rin 
et al. 2006), labor-market regulations (see Jeng and Wells 2000), and public spend-
ing on R&D, correlates with venture-capital activities (see Lerner and Tag 2013). 
For instance, the financial risk investors are facing can be mitigated through tax-sys-
tem provisions that favor risky start-up investments (e.g., by granting tax-loss carry-
forwards over several years). Especially in developed countries with their saturated 
economies, new ideas enhance productivity and therefore economic growth. For 
this reason, in the last decades, governments around the World have aimed at fos-
tering entrepreneurial activity. In particular, they have improved the legal environ-
ment (e.g., by the Small Business Act for Europe, a framework for the EU policy on 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) introduced in 2008), promoted the exchange 
between universities and business, and created so called techno parks for hosting 
start-ups (see, e.g., Haufler et al. 2014; Markman et al. 2008). However, there are 
still significant differences in venture-capital investments across countries that raise 
fundamental questions on these governmental initiatives.
2.2  Culture
New institutional theorists, such as North (1990, 1994), argue that the ‘rules of the 
game’ according to which individuals and organizations interact consist of both 
formal institutions (e.g., regulations or law enforcement) and informal institutions 
(e.g., culture). In the economics literature, culture has been argued to affect eco-
nomic outcomes in a variety of situations and dimensions.2 Fukuyama (1995, p. 
103) states that “non-rational factors like culture, religion, tradition, and other pre-
modern sources, will be key to the success of modern societies in a global econ-
omy”. According to Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1999), culture comprises shared 
values, norms, beliefs, and practices within a society that change only slowly from 
one generation to the next. In the case of venture capital, both entrepreneurs’ will-
ingness to start an enterprise and investors’ propensity to invest in risky projects 
may depend on their cultural heritage (see, e.g., Bruton et al. 2005; De Clercq et al. 
2 Economic growth (Franke et  al. 1991), economic development (Glahe and Vohries 1989), financial 
development (Beck et  al. 2003), financial intermediation (Aggarwal and Goodell 2010), foreign direct 
investment (Guiso et al. 2009; Siegel et al. 2013), government quality (La Porta et al. 1999), international 
capital flows (Siegel et al. 2011), board of directors (Volonté 2015) and ownership structure (Holderness 
2017), pension systems (Aggarwal and Goodell 2013), leverage (Li et  al. 2011), cash holdings (Chen 
et al. 2015), mergers and acquisitions (Ahern et al. 2015; Frijns et al. 2013; Stahl and Voigt 2008), finan-
cial contracts (Giannetti and Yafeh 2012), and cross-country venture capital flows (Bottazzi et al. 2016; 
Dai et al. 2012; Li et al. 2014; Nahata et al. 2014).
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2012). Hofstede et al. (2010) (HHM) describe a nation’s culture along six dimen-
sions3 that stem from people’s values and preferences within a country. As docu-
mented in the excellent review articles of Beugelsdijk et  al. (2017) and Kirkman 
et al. (2006), HHM’s work has triggered an extraordinary fruitful avenue of research 
in the field of international business and management to which we would like to 
contribute with this paper.
2.3  Individualism
Hofstede (1980) defines individualism as a “preference for a loosely-knit social 
framework in which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and 
their immediate families”. Individualism emphasizes individual freedom, personal 
responsibility, self-reward, and self-orientation. In this paper, we argue that the 
effect of individualism on venture-capital investments is positive because of the fol-
lowing reasons.
First, and most importantly, individualism fosters the entrepreneurial attitude as it 
is closely related to pro-market attitudes, risk-taking, entrepreneurship, and innova-
tion (see, e.g., Ang 2015; Chui et al. 2010; Li et al. 2013; Morris et al. 1994; Shane 
1992, 1993; Shao et  al. 2013; Taylor and Wilson 2012; Tiessen 1997; Yamagishi 
et al. 1998; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). For this reason, the feature of a very 
high level of individualism in the American culture may very well be one reason for 
the extraordinary success of venture capitalism in the US. In contrast, collectivism 
characterizes societies in which group affiliation (families, clans, personal relations, 
networks, and loyalty) and in-group thinking are important, and forms of nepotism 
may occur. Such an ‘insider’-system is rather counterproductive for innovative and 
‘out-of-the-box’ ideas which often accompany start-ups.
Second, a higher level of individualism within a country is also associated with 
conditions that favor venture-capital investments. For example, Han et  al. (2010) 
and Zhang et al. (2013) show that individualism is related to investor protection and 
thereby increases the willingness to provide capital to start-ups (see also Lerner and 
Schoar 2005). Individualism also improves accountability and transparency (Griffin 
et al. 2014), which, in turn, decreases the information asymmetry between the entre-
preneur and the venture capitalist, reduces capital costs, and fosters venture-capi-
tal investments. Finally, empirical evidence also suggests that individualism leads 
to better corporate governance (Haxhi and van Ees 2010) and thus reduces agency 
costs arising from conflict of interests between the venture capitalist (the principal) 
and the entrepreneur (the agent).
Third, several researchers also argue that individualism is positively related to 
generalized trust (e.g., Allik and Realo 2004; Huff and Kelley 2003, 2005; Realo 
et  al. 2008; Yamagishi et  al. 1998; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). In contrast 
3 Hofstede/HHM’s (1980, 2010) six dimensions of culture include, beside individualism-collectivism, 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity, long-term orientation, and indulgence.
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to particularized trust, generalized trust refers to the interpersonal relationships 
between people outside their group, which turns out to be particularly important for 
economic transactions (Banfield 1958).4,5 Generalized trust has been argued to affect 
economic outcomes, such as trade, growth, cross-border investments, development 
of stock markets, and overall economic activity (see, e.g., Algan and Cahuc 2010; 
Ang et al. 2015; Franks and Mayer 2017; Guiso et al. 2009; Sapienza and Zingales 
2012).6 Individualistic societies (e.g., European and Anglo-Saxon countries, such 
as the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada) with the excep-
tion of China (Bjornskov 2007; Steinhardt 2012) exhibit higher levels of generalized 
trust than collectivistic societies (e.g., countries in Asia, Africa or Latin America). 
Trust reduces transaction costs in principal-agent situations (Nannestad 2008; Wil-
liamson 1975) and, therefore, potentially fosters venture-capital investments (see, 
e.g., Bottazzi et al. 2016; Duffner et al. 2009; Fairchild 2011). Further, Kwon and 
Arenius (2010) find that generalized trust (or social capital) increases the perception 
of entrepreneurial opportunities and that investors in countries with higher general-
ized trust are more likely to invest in entrepreneurs with whom they have only weak 
personal ties. Our hypothesis is therefore stated as follows.
Hypothesis: Individualism is positively related to venture-capital investments.
3  Data and Definition of Variables
We consider all venture-capital transactions between 1998 and 2014 included in the 
Thomson ONE Banker’s database. Thomson ONE Banker is an established source 
for studies on venture capital (see, e.g., Dai et  al. 2012; Espenlaub et  al. 2015; 
Gompers et al. 2008; Guler and Guillén 2010; Li et al. 2014). Its private equity mod-
ule (formerly VentureXpert) integrates data from Thomson Venture Economics and 
Thomson Macdonald.
The sample covers over 300,000 venture capital transactions conducted in 148 
countries between 1998 and 2014, which corresponds to 2516 country-year obser-
vations. By requiring all countries to have at least one entry, we make sure that the 
4 Generalized trust describes the general level of (moralistic) trust within a society and refers to trust 
toward strangers and not toward known people. In contrast, particularized trust can be seen as trust 
established between known people and thus involves significant amounts of time for its creation. For the 
impact of trust on economic activity and investments within a country, the concept of generalized trust 
has thus to be the reference.
5 Lacking social capital (i.e., particularized trust dominating generalized trust) has been brought forward 
as a reason of Southern Italy’s relative poverty by Putnam et al. (1993).
6 Houser et al. (2010) differentiate between trust decisions and risky decisions by arguing that trust deci-
sions occur in principal-agent-relationships where one party’s decision affects another’s outcome, while 
risky decisions occur where the outcome is determined by statistical conditions (see also Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser 2004; Eckel and Wilson 2004). Similarly, Knight (1921) distinguishes between risk and 
uncertainty. Risk (and risk aversion) is related to objective interpretations of (statistical) probabilities 
(‘measurable uncertainty’) which are calculable, while uncertainty is related to subjective interpretations 
of probabilities (‘unmeasurable uncertainty’) which are based on human beliefs.
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countries considered are screened by Thomson Reuters with respect to venture-cap-
ital investments. We match this data with information about the countries’ cultural, 
economic, and institutional characteristics as provided by Hofstede’s homepage 
(geert-hofstede.com), CIA’s World Fact Book, and the World Bank. Due to missing 
values, we must exclude 60 countries, which leaves us with a final base sample of 88 
countries and 1496 country-year observations (see Table 1).
3.1  Venture‑Capital Investments
The dependent variable of this study is venture capital. It measures the total amount 
of risk capital received by young companies in a given country during a given year. 
This amount includes all investments in seed, early-stage, expansion, or later-stage 
start-ups that are classified as venture capital in Thomson ONE Banker. In conse-
quence, it includes all private-equity transactions except leverage buyouts. Thereby, 
financing is provided from various economic actors: individuals, business angels, 
corporations, governments, pension funds, and venture-capital funds.7 Figure  2 
depicts the cross-sectional variation of total venture-capital investments around the 
World.
3.2  Individualism
We use data on individualism from Geert Hofstede’s homepage on culture 
(http://geert -hofst ede.com). Individualism can take values from 0 to 100. Coun-
tries with scores below 50 are considered ‘collectivist’ and those with scores 
above 50 are considered ‘individualist’.
Table 1  Sample construction
Number of countries according to United Nations 193
 Number of countries without any venture capital transaction according to Thomson ONE Banker 45
Venture capital sample 148
 Number of countries not covered by World Bank or with missing values 11
 Number of countries without scores on Individualism 49
Number of countries in final sample 88
7 Thomson ONE Banker collects data on venture-capital investments and categorizes them—in depend-
ence of the providing actor/institution—into the following groups: “Angel Group”, “Bank Affiliated”, 
“Corporate PE/Venture”, “Endowment, Foundation or Pension Fund”, “Government Affiliated Program”, 
“Incubator/Development Program”, “Individuals”, “Insurance Firm Affiliate”, “Investment Manage-
ment Firm”, “Non-Private Equity”, “Other”, “Private Equity Advisor or Fund of Funds”, “Private Equity 
Firm”, “SBIC” (Small Business Investment Company), “Service Provider” and “University Program”.
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3.3  Control Variables
We account for several country characteristics that may affect venture-capital 
investments. GDP growth is computed as the one-year lagged annual change in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). We control for this variable because Jeng and 
Wells (2000), among others, argue that growing countries create more invest-
ing opportunities. GDP per capita is the GDP scaled by the population. Rule 
of law measures the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, 
and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. This variable stems 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project. A stronger rule of 
law should increase the willingness of investors to provide money to start-ups. 
Exports is the percentage of exports of goods and services to GDP. Population 
growth is computed as the annual population growth rate lagged by one  year. 
GDP is the Gross Domestic Product in US Dollars and is an indicator for a coun-
try’s economic importance and size. Definitions of baseline variables and sum-
mary statistics are provided in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. 
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix among all variables used in the baseline 
regressions.
Fig. 2  Venture capital world map (venture capital/GDP, X, Ø 1998–2014)
 P. Gantenbein et al.
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4  Methodology and Empirical Results
Individualism has been associated with entrepreneurial spirit. We estimate the 
following regression model to test the hypotheses about the effect of individual-
ism on venture-capital investments:
where venture capital is the total amount of venture-capital investments of coun-
try i in year t. Many countries have no venture-capital transactions in some years, 
therefore the distribution of our main dependent variable, venture capital, is strongly 
right-skewed. For this reason, we log transform it. We run pooled regressions with 
cluster-robust standard errors because errors are likely to be correlated within coun-
tries. As our focus variable, individualism, is time invariant, we are not able to use 
country fixed effects which would account for unobserved (and time-invariant) 
national characteristics.
4.1  Baseline Model
The regression results of our baseline model provide first empirical evidence that 
individualism is positively related to venture capital (Table 5, column II). Impor-
tantly, the variance inflator factors never exceed 5, which indicates that multicol-
linearity is not a serious issue for our regression results. In addition, the regres-
sion in column III indicates that individualism explains one third of the variation 
of venture-capital investments across countries. Conversely, only two thirds of 
the variation of venture capital around the world are not explained by this single 
variable.
This relationship is also depicted in Fig. 3: in panel (a) for the total sample and 
in panel (b) and panel (c) for high- and low-income countries, respectively.
venture capitali,t = 훼 + 훽1 ⋅ individualismi,t + 훿 ⋅ controlsi,t + 휀i,t,
Table 3  Summary statistics
Summary statistics of the variables. The sample consists of 1496 country-year observations from 1998 to 
2014. The table presents mean, median, minimum (Min), and maximum (Max) values as well as standard 
deviation (SD) for each variable
Mean Median Min Max SD
Venture capital (M$) 577 4 0 106,900 4299
Individualism 40.2 32.5 6.0 91.0 22.9
GDP growth (in %) 3.7 3.8 − 14.8 33.7 3.9
GDP per capita 16,410 7694 148 116,700 19,396
Rule of law 0.33 0.17 − 1.89 2.12 1.00
Exports (in % of GDP) 43.96 34.54 7.03 230.30 33.70
Population growth (in %) 1.2 1.1 − 4.9 17.3 1.5
GDP (M$) 571,700 117,800 636 17,350,000 1,655,279
 P. Gantenbein et al.
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4.2  Additional Economic Control Variables
As individualism may also affect other economic and institutional factors which in 
turn may influence venture-capital investments, we include a battery of additional 
control variables in the next step. All the data is provided by the World Bank. Unem-
ployment is the percentage of labor force without jobs and is lagged by one year. A 
higher rate of unemployment may increase the pool of (necessity-based) entrepre-
neurs. Market capitalization/GDP is market capitalization of listed companies in a 
country divided by GDP and lagged by one year. It is used as a proxy for the devel-
opment of financial markets and the venture capitalists’ opportunities to exit their 
investment via an IPO, which increases their willingness to invest in the first place 
(see Black and Gilson 1998; Jeng and Wells 2000; Nahata et  al. 2014). Foreign 
direct investments is the ratio of foreign direct investment net inflows (FDI) to GDP. 
It measures a countries’ openness to foreign capital (see Kim and Lu 2013; Nahata 
et al. 2014). Trade is the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. Real inter-
est rate (lagged by one year) proxies both financing costs and the economic condi-
tions of a country. Inflation is also lagged by one year and proxies for the general 
financial stability of a country. Company taxes are taxes on income, profits, and 
capital gains in percent of revenue. Higher taxes potentially curb investments (Da 
Rin et  al. 2006; Popov and Roosenboom 2013). As Zak and Knack (2001) argue 
that income equality fosters generalized trust within a society and potentially affects 
individualism, we further include the Gini coefficient which assumes a value of 0 
for perfect income equality and 100 for perfect inequality. Tertiary education is the 
Table 5  Individualism and venture-capital investments
The table presents regression coefficient estimates for individualism. The sample consists of 2329, 1496, 
and 1513 country-year observations respectively from 1998 to 2014. Cluster-robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respec-
tively
Log venture capital
(I) (II) (III)
(Intercept) − 3.53814*** (0.785) − 7.01906*** (1.060) − 0.18940 (0.379)
Individualism 0.02745*** (0.007) 0.06617*** (0.009)
GDP growth 0.00187 (0.012) 0.03139* (0.019)
Log GDP per capita − 0.35381*** (0.127) − 0.47998*** (0.128)
Rule of law 1.10858*** (0.139) 0.85768*** (0.163)
Exports 0.00133 (0.003) 0.00787** (0.003)
Population growth − 0.04141 (0.039) 0.04807 (0.060)
Log GDP 0.76758*** (0.087) 1.02060*** (0.098)
Years Included Included Excluded
Number of observations 2329 1496 1513
R2 0.629 0.689 0.330
Adj.  R2 0.623 0.678 0.330
F-statistic 177.8*** 141.6*** 745.4***
 P. Gantenbein et al.
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Fig. 3  Relation between individualism and venture-capital investments (log)
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fraction of labor force with tertiary education. Dearmon and Grier (2011) show that 
trust fosters education and education could thereby be interrelated with individual-
ism. R&D expenditures is used as a proxy for the capacity of innovation of a coun-
try (Lerner and Tag 2013). Finally, life expectancy measures the number of years a 
newborn infant can expect to live. However, by adding these additional control vari-
ables, our sample is reduced to 924 country-year observations.8
In Table 6, column I, we first include economic factors, such as the unemploy-
ment rate, market capitalization to GDP or company taxes, which have been argued 
to affect venture-capital investments (see, e.g., Jeng and Wells 2000). In column 
II, we include variables that may capture the propensity to start an enterprise, such 
as tertiary education or R&D expenditures. In column III both sets of variables 
are integrated. The empirical evidence shows that individualism does not lose its 
strongly significant and positive relationship with venture-capital investments.
4.3  Language and Religion
Groups that speak the same language or believe in the same religion often share the 
same values. Therefore, language and religion have been used as proxies for culture. 
As an example, Stulz and Williamson (2003) measure culture by language and reli-
gion when examining the effect of culture on investor rights. Several other authors 
use also a country’s language and religion as a proxy for culture (see, e.g., Grinblatt 
and Keloharju 2001; Guiso et al. 2003, 2006).9 The advantage of this approach is 
that it allows researchers to aggregate countries along clearly defined dimensions 
(language and religion) (see Gupta et al. 2002; Ronen and Shenkar 1985; Schwartz 
2014).
According to Hofstede (1980), language is the most important and recognizable 
element of culture. He argues that people speaking the same language within a spe-
cific territory share a common culture. Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggest that 
a common language facilitates the exchange of information. Similarly, Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2001) track back the home bias to language. Finally, Kashima and 
Kashima (1998) find that languages in which pronouns are not dropped (e.g., Eng-
lish, French, and German) are more often spoken in countries with higher individu-
alism than languages in which pronouns are dropped (Arabic, Spanish, Italian, and 
most Asian languages).
As language is an important expression of culture, we include six main lan-
guages in our analysis: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, and Spanish. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to include languages that are only spoken in one 
country (e.g., Swedish, Finnish, and Norwegian), because this variable would 
8 In cases in which control variables that are rather stable (e.g., life expectancy, tertiary education or 
company taxes) had missing values in single years, we replaced the missing values in order to save 
degrees of freedom by averages between two data points available or inserted available values before or 
after the missing values.
9 A good survey on the effect of religion on economic development is provided by Aldashev and Plat-
teau (2014).
 P. Gantenbein et al.
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capture all other institutional factors of this specific country, i.e., it would act as a 
fixed effect for those countries.
Bjornskov (2007), Delhey and Newton (2005), and Knack and Keefer (1997) 
suggest that ethnic diversity within a country lowers trust and could therefore 
simultaneously affect individualism and curb venture-capital investments. It is 
possible that the cohabitation of people that speak different languages has a simi-
lar effect. Therefore, we include the variable linguistic index in the model, which 
measures fractionalization of languages within countries by using Herfindahl 
index from Alesina et al. (2003).
Table 7, columns I and II show that Chinese and French are positively related 
to venture-capital investments, whereas Arabic is negatively related to it. 
Table 6  Individualism, additional control variables and venture-capital investments
The table presents regression coefficient estimates for individualism. The sample consists of 1496 coun-
try-year observations from 1998 to 2014. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Sig-
nificance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively
Log venture capital
(I) (II) (III)
(Intercept) − 10.75800*** (1.414) − 10.69656*** (2.959) − 8.39204*** (2.717)
Individualism 0.02573*** (0.007) 0.03584*** (0.008) 0.03468*** (0.008)
GDP growth 0.03972 (0.025) 0.02431 (0.023) 0.00124 (0.027)
Log GDP per capita − 0.19447 (0.166) − 0.51764* (0.311) − 0.32486 (0.234)
Rule of law 0.60865*** (0.199) 0.34340 (0.248) 0.48118** (0.224)
Exports − 0.02809 (0.019) 0.00738 (0.005) − 0.03959* (0.021)
Population growth 0.12257 (0.096) 0.05223 (0.122) 0.11554 (0.133)
Unemployment − 0.02177 (0.022) − 0.05152** (0.026)
Market capitalization/GDP 0.00111 (0.002) − 0.00084 (0.002)
Foreign direct investments 0.00651* (0.004) 0.02994*** (0.011)
Trade 0.01874* (0.010) 0.02376** (0.011)
Real interest rate 0.01118 (0.008) 0.00642 (0.010)
Inflation 0.00476** (0.002) 0.00398** (0.002)
Company taxes − 0.00078 (0.009) − 0.00957 (0.009)
Gini coefficient 0.02774* (0.016) 0.02944** (0.014)
Tertiary education 0.01661 (0.012) 0.01848* (0.010)
R&D expenditures 0.66885*** (0.178) 0.61531*** (0.188)
Life expectancy 0.03739 (0.051) − 0.02687 (0.040)
Log GDP 1.12880*** (0.104) 0.93079*** (0.094) 1.02823*** (0.101)
Years Included Included Included
Number of observations 1265 968 924
R2 0.718 0.775 0.793
Adj.  R2 0.700 0.753 0.763
F-statistic 104.7*** 119.9*** 103.1***
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However, the inclusion of a country’s language does not reduce the strong rela-
tion between individualism and venture capital.
Religion is another important expression of culture (Tarakeshwar et al. 2003). It 
influences norms, beliefs, and rules for behavioral relationships and creates identity. 
Several empirical studies document that religion influences economic performance 
(Glahe and Vorhies 1989; Noland 2005), the level of creditor rights (Stulz and Wil-
liamson 2003), the quality of government (La Porta et  al. 1999), and corporate 
Table 7  Individualism, language, religion, and venture capital
The table presents regression coefficient estimates for individualism, religion, and language. The sam-
ple consists of 1496 country-year observations from 1998 to 2014. Cluster-robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respec-
tively
Log venture capital
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
(Intercept) − 7.43710*** 
(0.889)
− 7.62491*** 
(1.042)
− 4.87365*** 
(1.214)
− 5.49119*** 
(1.124)
Individualism 0.03015*** 
(0.008)
0.02961*** 
(0.007)
0.02531*** 
(0.007)
0.02222*** (0.007)
Arabic − 1.18816*** 
(0.341)
− 1.14841*** 
(0.338)
Chinese 2.91646*** 
(0.483)
2.97324*** 
(0.530)
English 0.43687 (0.329) 0.41467 (0.338)
French 0.44153** (0.221) 0.42266* (0.233)
German 0.31601 (0.315) 0.29324 (0.309)
Spanish − 0.26777 (0.297) − 0.23718 (0.304)
Linguistic index 0.20732 (0.539)
Buddhism − 1.75709*** 
(0.645)
− 1.88327*** 
(0.573)
Catholicism − 1.74969*** 
(0.626)
− 1.83681*** 
(0.564)
Islam − 2.41389*** 
(0.634)
− 2.44535*** 
(0.554)
Orthodox Christi-
anity
− 1.32778* (0.711) − 1.42789** (0.665)
Protestantism − 1.34466** 
(0.661)
− 1.67346*** 
(0.601)
Religious index 1.28718*** (0.414)
Control variables Included Included Included Included
Years Included Included Included Included
Number of obser-
vations
1496 1496 1496 1496
R2 0.732 0.733 0.726 0.736
Adj.  R2 0.717 0.718 0.712 0.721
F-statistic 133.5*** 129.9*** 138.9*** 141.1***
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decisions (Hilary and Hui 2009). The values attributed to different religions have 
been argued to influence the society’s perception of markets. According to Weber 
(1930), the Protestant work ethic has laid ground to capitalism and economic wealth. 
In fact, Hayward and Kemmelmeier (2011) find evidence that Protestant countries 
and Protestant people within countries have particularly pronounced pro-market 
attitudes. There is also strong empirical evidence that beliefs, values, and attitudes 
associated with religion, rather than religion itself, affect economic outcomes (see 
Arrunada 2010; Barro and McCleary 2003; Guiso et al. 2006; Hayward and Kem-
melmeier 2011; La Porta et al. 1997). Protestants can also be seen as being more 
individualistic in their characteristics of pursuing economic success (Bjornskov 
2007).
We include five major religions in our empirical analysis: Buddhism, Catholi-
cism, Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Protestantism. According to several sources, 
Protestantism is expected to be positively related with venture-capital investments. 
Again, we do not include religions that are country-specific, such as Hinduism, 
because they would capture all other aspects of a given country. Similar to the use 
of a Linguistic index, we include the variable religious index that measures religious 
heterogeneity within a country (see Alesina et al. 2003).
Interestingly, the results in Table 7, columns III and IV indicate that all religions 
have a negative influence on venture-capital investments relative to the reference 
category ‘other’ which includes Daoism (in China), Hinduism, Judaism, Syncretism 
(in Zimbabwe), and local beliefs. Furthermore, the results also suggest that religious 
diversity is positively related to venture-capital investments, which, however, does 
not affect the positive relationship of individualism with venture capital.
4.4  Formal Institutional Environment
An efficient legal system that ensures abidance of contract provisions is vital for 
trade and economic development (see, e.g., Levine 2005). For example, in a well-
functioning legal system, an entrepreneur who steals money will get prosecuted. In 
this respect, a functioning legal system will promote the transmission from ideas to 
products and services and, in consequence, lead to economic growth. Law (e.g., the 
protection of (intellectual) property rights) therefore is seen as a driver of innovation 
and growth; the lack of it may explain why some economies have failed to experi-
ence a positive development. Property rights increase financing available to firms 
and decrease their cost of capital (Hail and Leuz 2006; Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
Using a sample of 41 countries, Zak and Knack (2001) show that national growth 
rises with an increase in trust. One reason for this finding could be that countries 
with lower levels of trust create an unfavorable institutional environment for entre-
preneurship and economic growth. For instance, Aghion et al. (2010) show that low-
trust countries are characterized by higher regulation. Several authors find evidence 
that individualism is positively related to investor protection (Han et al. 2010; Zhang 
et al. 2013), accountability, transparency (Griffin et al. 2014), and corporate govern-
ance (Haxhi and van Ees 2010).
1 3
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The theory of legal origins has been used to explain differences in economic sys-
tems and performance around the world. In a series of papers, La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998, 2000, 2008) provide empirical evidence that French civil law offers lower 
investor protection in contrast to Common law which favors a more efficient allo-
cation of capital and higher economic performance. The Legal Origins Hypothesis 
states that differences in legal rules and regulations can be attributed to the jurisdic-
tions’ legal origins (common-law countries are more focused on market-supporting 
regulations, such as investor protection, whereas civil-law countries rely on state-
centered capitalistic policies) and that these differences have an effect on economic 
outcomes. It is important to note, however, that also the level of investor protection 
might be a consequence of a country’s culture or level of individualism (see, e.g., 
Roe 2003).
In addition to the variable rule of law of our baseline model, we also include in 
our regressions the dummy variables Common law, French civil law, German civil 
law, Nordic civil law, and Socialistic law (mixed law serves as reference variable). 
We obtain information on the origin of the legal system from Djankov et al. (2007) 
and NYU’s GlobaLex.
To account for the positive relationship between formal institutions and venture-
capital investments documented in Li and Zahra (2012), we include in the regres-
sions the overall score of worldwide governance indicator (World Bank),10 strength 
of legal rights index (World Bank; 0 = weak to 10 = strong), economic freedom over-
all score (Heritage Foundation), and corruption perceptions index (Transparency 
International). For all indicators, a higher number stands for a better score.
Table 8 shows the regression results controlling for the possible effect of formal 
institutions. All indices measuring the quality of formal institutions except for Eco-
nomic freedom overall score are positively and significantly related to venture-cap-
ital investments. In column I Nordic civil law has a positive and significant coeffi-
cient. However, once the other formal institution variables are included (column IV), 
the significance of Nordic civil law vanishes.
4.5  Cultural Dimensions
Beside the dichotomy individualism-collectivism, Hofstede (1980) mentions power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-femininity as other important cul-
tural dimensions. Licht et  al. (2005) show that power distance (i.e., greater toler-
ance for hierarchy) is negatively related to investor protection, which may restrain 
people to invest. Gupta et al. (2004) argue that higher power distance is detrimen-
tal to entrepreneurship. Shane (1992, 1993) suggests that higher power distance is 
negatively related to innovation. Finally, also negotiations have been argued to suffer 
in case of higher power distance (Chan and Cheung 2016). In countries with a high 
level of uncertainty avoidance, people may worry more about the unknown future. 
10 WGI is the equally weighted average of all six governance dimensions: The index consists of voice 
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regu-
latory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
 P. Gantenbein et al.
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A culture of uncertainty avoidance has been argued to be an obstacle to venture-
capital investments (Hofstede 1980) and has been associated with Continental Euro-
pean countries rather than Anglo-Saxon countries. Shane (1993, 1995) finds a nega-
tive relationship between uncertainty avoidance and innovation or entrepreneurship. 
Research also suggests that higher uncertainty avoidance scores relate to higher 
risk-aversion (Beugelsdijk and Frijns 2010; Chui and Kwok 2008; Frijns et al. 2013; 
Kwok and Tadesse 2006; Rieger et al. 2015). Finally, masculinity describes a soci-
ety’s preferences for achievement and material rewards for success.
We include power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity as well as the 
newer dimensions of culture by Hofstede (long-term orientation and indulgence, 
see HHM 2010) into our model. The results in Table  9 indicate that uncertainty 
avoidance and masculinity are negatively related to venture capital, while long-term 
orientation is positively related to it. Furthermore, and surprisingly, the additional 
Table 9  Cultural dimensions, trust, and venture-capital investments
The table presents regression coefficient estimates for cultural dimensions. The sample consists of 1496 
country-year observations from 1998 to 2014. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively
Log venture capital
(I) (II) (III)
(Intercept) − 5.98180*** (1.136) − 7.54792*** (1.343) − 7.89877*** (1.140)
Individualism 0.01908*** (0.007) 0.01992*** (0.007) 0.02624*** (0.007)
Power distance − 0.01102 (0.010) 0.00091 (0.009)
Uncertainty avoidance − 0.01676*** (0.006) − 0.02034*** (0.006)
Masculinity − 0.00666 (0.004) − 0.00948** (0.005)
Long-term orientation 0.01055* (0.006)
Indulgence 0.00620 (0.005)
Trust 0.00745 (0.005)
GDP growth 0.01569 (0.016) 0.01653 (0.017) 0.03290* (0.019)
Log GDP per capita − 0.29877** (0.118) − 0.28464* (0.160) − 0.44181*** (0.146)
Rule of law 0.54225*** (0.183) 0.65642*** (0.179) 0.76272*** (0.180)
Exports 0.00569** (0.003) 0.00370 (0.003) 0.00851*** (0.003)
Population growth 0.01626 (0.057) − 0.04399 (0.101) 0.10302 (0.093)
Log GDP 1.03806*** (0.096) 1.05668*** (0.097) 1.03192*** (0.083)
Years Included Included Included
Number of observations 1496 1258 1411
R2 0.709 0.735 0.703
Adj.  R2 0.696 0.718 0.691
F-statistic 137.4*** 121.8*** 137.0***
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variable trust11 is not linked to venture capital. Importantly, in all these models, indi-
vidualism remains strongly and significantly related to venture-capital investments.
4.6  Geographic Conditions
Research also suggests that the geographical location of a country and health con-
ditions within countries affect economic outcomes, such as economic growth (see, 
e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001; Gorodnichenko and Roland 2017; Sachs and Malaney 
2002). Therefore, we include internal distance of country, landlocked, and latitude 
from GeoDist Database by CEPII, and malaria infections from Geography Datasets 
by Gallup et al. (1999). Our results suggest, however, that geography plays a minor 
role in explaining differences in venture-capital investments across countries (results 
not reported).
4.7  Moderating and Mediating Effects
Based on the insights from new institutional theory (North 1990, 1994; Scott 1995; 
Williamson 2000) that formal and informal institutions affect economic outcomes in 
both a direct and indirect way, in this section we aim at shedding light on the nature 
of the previously established relationship between individualism and venture-capital 
investments. In particular, we investigate whether the influence of individualism on 
venture capital is moderated and/or mediated by formal and informal institutions as 
suggested by institutional theorists.
With respect to possible moderating effects of this relationship, we consider vari-
ables related to economic conditions as well as countries’ formal and informal insti-
tutions and interact them with individualism. In Table 10, we report the results for 
selected variables that, based on the theoretical considerations presented in Sect. 2.3, 
we deem as particularly plausible moderators of the effect of individualism on ven-
ture-capital investments because they are related to entrepreneurial attitudes (uncer-
tainty avoidance), the quality of formal institutions (rule of law), generalized trust 
(trust), and economic conditions (GDP per capita). Specifically, we create dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 if the values of the related continuous variables 
are either in the highest or in the lowest quartile, respectively. In all models, indi-
vidualism has a positive and significant effect on venture capital. Furthermore, in 
Table 10, Regression I, the interaction of GDP per capita high with individualism is 
positive and significant, which indicates that the influence of individualism on ven-
ture-capital investments always exists but that it is particularly strong in more-devel-
oped countries with higher GDP per capita. Interestingly, no moderating effect could 
be found in the data with respect to entrepreneurial attitudes, formal institutions, and 
generalized trust. Additionally, we have tested in the same fashion (not reported) 
11 The variable Trust is obtained from World Value Survey and measures generalized trust by asking 
people the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”.
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moderating effects related to religion (Buddhism, Catholicism, Orthodox, Protes-
tant, and other) and Hofstede’s other cultural variables (masculinity, power distance, 
long-term orientation, and indulgence). In all regressions, individualism remained 
positive and significant. Further, only in the case of long-term orientation, the inter-
action term with individualism was negative and significant (t-value −2.05), which 
may indicate that individualism and long-term orientation are partial substitutes in 
promoting venture-capital investments. No other moderating effect was detected.
In Fig. 4, we provide interaction-effect graphs for the moderating effects of the 
variables (a) GDP per capita, (b) rule of law, (c) uncertainty avoidance, and (d) trust 
by showing the relation between individualism and the marginal linear predictions 
of venture-capital investments for high and low values of the corresponding mod-
erating variable. Remarkably, the slopes are positive in all graphs, which indicates 
a consistent and positive cross-country relation between individualism and venture-
capital investments. Further, countries with higher GDP per capita, stronger rule of 
law, lower uncertainty avoidance, and higher trust display a more pronounced rela-
tionship between individualism and venture-capital investments. However, only in 
the case of high-income countries (panel (a)), this difference is statistically signifi-
cant (as previously shown in Table 10).
To test for the presence of mediating effects, we follow Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
established three-step procedure. First, we estimate the influence of individualism 
on the mediating variable (by including controls). Second, we regress venture-capi-
tal investments on individualism (with controls but without the mediating variable). 
Fig. 4  Interaction-effect graphs for the moderating variables a GDP per capita, b rule of law, c uncer-
tainty avoidance, and d trust
1 3
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Third, we estimate a model to explain venture-capital investments that includes both 
individualism and the mediating variable. To exert a mediating effect, a variable 
should (1) be significantly related to individualism in the first-step regression, (2) 
affect venture-capital investments in the third-step regression, and (3) lead to a sig-
nificant reduction of the coefficient of individualism when moving from the second-
step regression to the third-step regression (we follow Hicks and Tingley (2012) and 
measure the indirect effect by means of bootstrapping).
Based on the theory presented in Sect. 2.3, entrepreneurial attitudes (uncertainty 
avoidance), the quality of formal institutions (rule of law), generalized trust (trust), 
and economic conditions (GDP per capita) are likely to mediate the effect of indi-
vidualism on venture-capital investments. As shown in Table  11, out of the four 
main variables, uncertainty avoidance and rule of law are actually found to partially 
mediate the effect of individualism on venture-capital investments. Their mediation 
is, however, not complete because the coefficient of individualism on venture-cap-
ital investments decreases from the second-step to the third-step regression but it 
remains positive and significant also when including any of these mediators in the 
third-step regression. In particular, the indirect effects of individualism on venture-
capital investments mediated by uncertainty avoidance and rule of law amount to 
27.08% and 35.94% of the total effect (i.e., direct plus indirect effect), respectively 
(results unreported). On the contrary, GDP per capita and trust cannot be mediators 
because they are both unrelated to individualism (see Table 11, first equation).
4.8  Addressing Endogeneity with an Instrumental‑Variable Approach: Polity 
Score
Endogeneity caused by omitted variables and simultaneity may flaw our empiri-
cal analysis. We therefore tackled the omitted-variable bias by including numerous 
control variables. Simultaneity may not present a significant issue in our analysis 
because culture and the prevailing system of beliefs, values, and norms that affect 
individualism are deeply rooted within a society and evolve only very slowly (Hof-
stede 1980). In this respect, Licht (2001) defines culture as the ‘mother of all path 
dependencies’. However, in order to exclude the potential issues of endogeneity, we 
employ an instrumental-variable approach.
In particular, we use the Revised Combined Polity Score (polity score) from the 
Polity IV Project ‘Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2014’ 
as an instrument for individualism.12 The score ranks political systems on a scale 
from − 10 (strongly autocratic) to + 10 (strongly democratic) by subtracting the 
score of ‘Institutionalized autocracy’ from ‘Institutionalized democracy’. We use 
the average of this score from 1816 (just after Congress of Vienna) to 1913 (just 
before World War I).13 For example, during this period Thailand obtained a value 
of − 10 (strongly autocratic) while Switzerland received a value of + 10 (strongly 
12 http://www.syste micpe ace.org/inscr /p4v20 14.xls.
13 For countries that did not exist in 1816, we compute the polity score average from the foundation year 
to 1912. For example, in the case of Italy 1861–1913.
 P. Gantenbein et al.
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democratic). The Congress of Vienna has set many long-lasting territorial bor-
ders and has stabilized Europe for almost 100  years until World War I, despite 
the revolutions of the mid-nineteenth-century. Considering earlier historical eras 
appears inappropriate because, from a historical perspective, the modern concept 
of individualism has become important for the first time in history during the 
Renaissance (fourteenth to seventeenth century) (Burckhardt 1867). It is reason-
able that the political settings in the period from 1816 to 1913 have influenced 
peoples’ attitudes toward individual freedom, personal responsibility, reward atti-
tude, and self-orientation—traits which are all associated with individualism. As 
some countries did not exist at the time (e.g., Croatia or Ukraine) or were not 
covered by polity score, the choice of this instrument reduces the sample to 782 
country-year observations.
First-stage regressions in Table 12 show that polity score is relevant as it is posi-
tively and significantly related to individualism. The F test of 23.6 exceeding the 
rule of thumb threshold of 10 shows that the instrument is relevant (see Staiger et al. 
1997). As we have only one instrument for our endogenous variable and the model 
is therefore exactly identified, we cannot test the exogeneity of the instrument. How-
ever, reduced-form regressions indicate that our instrument is not directly related 
to venture-capital investments (the same is true if individualism is also included in 
the regression). We are therefore confident that our instrument is valid. Importantly, 
no direct impact of the political system 200 years ago can be expected on today’s 
venture-capital investments, which offers a strong argument for the exogeneity of the 
instrument (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2010). The results of the two-stage-least square 
Table 12  Instrumental variable approach: Polity score
The table presents regression coefficient estimates for individualism. The sample consists of 782 coun-
try-year observations from 1998 to 2014. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively
First stage Reduced-form Second stage
Individualism Log venture capital Log venture capital
(Intercept) − 33.56959 (34.570) − 5.05627** (2.290) − 8.02994*** (1.084)
Individualism 0.06314*** (0.014)
Polity score 0.92692** (0.453) 0.05431 (0.038)
GDP growth − 0.63791** (0.316) 0.03227*** (0.010) 0.07655*** (0.021)
Log GDP per capita 3.64810 (4.519) − 0.85684*** (0.323) − 0.54561*** (0.139)
Rule of law 9.34809** (4.354) 1.20739*** (0.305) 0.19600 (0.197)
Exports 0.06923 (0.089) 0.01221** (0.005) 0.00801*** (0.003)
Population growth − 3.35639 (2.147) 0.02828 (0.105) − 0.03377 (0.074)
Log GDP 3.85676** (1.504) 1.23560*** (0.138) 1.04341*** (0.066)
Years Included Included Included
Number of observations 782 901 782
R2 0.677 0.747 0.725
Adj.  R2 0.656 0.728 0.703
F-statistic 68.9*** 112.8*** 83.9***
 P. Gantenbein et al.
1 3
regression indicate that individualism is still positively related to venture-capital 
investments.
4.9  Robustness Checks
We round off the analysis by performing a battery of robustness checks. First, in 
Table  13 we re-run the baseline models by using different specifications of ven-
ture-capital investments: venture capital/GDP, number of transactions/population, 
and seed. Seed is the volume of seed capital, i.e., the first stage of venture capital 
invested in start-ups.
With all three dependent variables (Table  13, columns I–III), the relationship 
between individualism and venture capital remains positive and significant. Also, 
when running Logit (column IV), Tobit (column V), and Random effects models 
(column VI), the results are qualitatively equivalent.
Higher venture-capital investments may also depend on the existence of specific 
providers of risk capital within a country, namely individuals and governments. As 
Brander et al. (2015) show, venture capital sponsored by governments increases total 
venture-capital investments within a country. Our results show that also the exist-
ence of such particular groups of investors does not affect the relationship between 
individualism and venture-capital investments (results not reported). Additionally, 
we use supply rather than demand of venture capital as our dependent variable. 
However, also in this case the results do not change.
We also run regressions on a variety of subsamples to check whether the find-
ings are driven by specific countries. As shown in Table 14 (and depicted in Fig. 3b, 
c), individualism remains positively and significantly related to venture-capital 
investments across different sets of income groups even when excluding large coun-
tries, such as the United States and China that account for 67.3% and 8.6% of total 
venture-capital volume in the sample, respectively. Finally, individualism remains 
strongly related to venture-capital investments during the two periods of financial 
crises, 2000–2003 and 2007–2009 (results not reported).
5  Conclusion
Venture capital is essential for economic growth and prosperity. Nevertheless, the 
high growth perspectives of start-ups and the potential returns that go along with 
them are associated with substantial risk on the side of entrepreneurs and investors. 
Due to its high risk, venture capital has been argued to be undersupplied in coun-
tries characterized by specific cultural elements. Individualism, which is intrinsi-
cally related with values of individual freedom, personal responsibility, and reward, 
is a driving factor of entrepreneurial spirit and, thus, venture-capital investments. 
By accounting for economic conditions, (formal) institutional factors, and other cul-
tural aspects, our results show that individualism increases venture-capital invest-
ments, even after controlling for endogeneity. This result remains robust in a variety 
of settings. The effect of individualism on venture-capital investments is found to 
1 3
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be partially mediated by the quality of formal institutions (rule of law) and entre-
preneurial attitudes (uncertainty avoidance), and moderated by economic conditions 
(GDP per capita).
Governmental market interventions are usually justified by market failures, e.g., 
the presence of asymmetrically distributed information, negative externalities, 
monopolies, and public goods (positive externalities). Even though it is difficult to 
identify market failures, venture capital is potentially affected by strong informa-
tion asymmetries and positive externalities similar to those that affect the provision 
of public goods. Measures directed towards improving the supply of venture capi-
tal have most often aimed at strengthening the (formal) institutional environment. 
However, governments that attempt to promote venture-capital investments should 
be aware that not all recipes that work in one country are applicable to others. As 
shown in this study, this may be due to fundamental cultural differences across 
countries. In countries with low levels of individualism, politics could rather make 
campaigns to inform about the (social) benefits of entrepreneurship. Further, venture 
capitalists involved in cross-border investments should consider cultural differences 
across countries in order to exploit the opportunities of new international markets.
Along with these novel findings, our study has some limitations. First of all, indi-
vidualism may not be the best proxy of entrepreneurial spirit. For example, it has 
been suggested that individualism may lead to overconfidence (Chen et  al. 2015; 
Van Den Steen 2004). Hence, overconfidence—rather than individualism—may 
result in higher venture-capital investments. Furthermore, corporate venture capi-
tal, corporate entrepreneurship, and corporate innovation may be underestimated 
in our data. In collectivistic countries, such as Japan, entrepreneurship may also 
occur in existing corporations and may be driven by the existence of high levels 
of loyalty within Japanese corporations (similar to families). Additionally, there are 
countries, such as Belgium, Canada, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, in which 
different “cultures” cohabit. In our study, however, also due to the lack of regional 
data on individualism and control variables, we rely on within-country averages of 
individualism and perform a cross-country study. We rely on data of Thomson ONE 
Banker which registers venture-capital transactions from various sources. Neverthe-
less, in some countries, start-up financing may be provided from sources for which 
information is not disclosed, e.g., for reasons of confidentiality. Such venture-capital 
investments will also not appear in Thomson ONE Banker’s database. As this selec-
tive reporting could be more pronounced in collectivist countries, we cannot exclude 
biased results. Additionally, data does not include venture debt or mezzanine finance 
to start-ups, which may underestimate the magnitude of venture-capital invest-
ments in countries with more developed debt markets. Finally, some controls that 
stem from the World Bank database are often not available for countries in emerg-
ing markets, which complicates the task of evaluating the effect of individualism on 
venture-capital investments around the world.
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